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For almost two thousand years the Jews lived as a religious minority,
sometimes tolerated and at other times persecuted in a great number of
countries. Only in 1948 did they succeed in establishing a State in which
they constituted a majority of the population. Moreover, this State was
formally established as a "Jewish State." These circumstances explain
the special interest in the question of how and to what extent Israel rec-
ognizes and implements the right to freedom of religion and of con-
science.
Like all other human rights, this one has to be judged not simply by the
general proclamation of the right but by the details of its implementation
and by its limitations. It is therefore our intention to start, after a few
preliminary remarks, with an examination of the Jewish character of the
State, and of the principle of freedom of religion and of conscience, as
well as of the limitations of this freedom. The study of the implementa-
tion of the principle requires an analysis of certain details: the status of
the Holy Places, equality of rights of members of different religions, the
right to change one's religion, regulation of proselytizing activities, the
right to a religious education, matters of personal status, and the situa-
tion of persons who do not belong to any religious group. The 1981
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intoler-
ance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief' also mentions
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1. Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171,
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most of these subjects as ingredients of freedom of religion2 but some are
not, namely, those that are relevant only to few countries, including Is-
rael, specifically, the Holy Places and jurisdiction in matters of personal
status.
II. SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS
1. Israel has a rather heterogeneous population, belonging to various
ethnic groups, adhering to different religions, speaking several languages,
having different cultural and social traditions, and with many different
political allegiances and ideologies. Thus, religious affiliation is often
connected with ethnic origin, language, culture, and political allegiance.
2. The country is not only inhabited by adherents of various religions,
but it is also holy to four major faiths: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and
Baha'i. For Judaism, the country as such is holy; for Christianity and Is-
lam several places in the country are holy; and for the Baha'is it is not
only the site of various Holy Places but also of their spiritual and admin-
istrative world center.
3. About eighty percent of the population is Jewish, but the Jews are
rather divided on matters of religion.
4. Israel has no written constitution. When the State was established,
the Constituent Assembly decided not to draft a Constitution; instead,
basic laws on the various aspects of government and administration
would be adopted gradually. Until 1992, human rights and civil rights
were not codified in a basic law. Rather, they were guaranteed by the
Judiciary, which has gradually developed a voluminous case law on the
subject (similar to the situation in the United Kingdom). In 1992, how-
ever, the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty were adopted.' These laws do not deal specifically
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
2. See id. However, due to the objection of some Muslim States, the Declaration
does not expressly mention the right to change one's religion. See Natan Lerner, The Fi-
nal Text of the U.N. Declaration Against Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, 12 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 185, 185-89 (1982). It is, however, generally recognized
that under international law freedom of religion includes the right to convert. See Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 172, 178
[hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 18, G.A.
Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810, at 74 (1948) [hereinafter Univer-
sal Declaration]; see also Lerner, supra, 185-89.
3. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1991/92, S.H. 114, amended by Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation, 1993/94, S.H. 90 (another amendment was introduced in March
1998); Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1991/92, S.H. 150, amended by Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90.
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with freedom of religion, but they do have an impact on this subject, to
be explained below.
5. Due to the system of government that prevails in Israel, a multi-
party parliamentary democracy, Jewish orthodox religious parties have a
considerable influence on the political life of the country.
6. Like many other Middle Eastern countries, Israelis fear the spread
of religious fundamentalism.
III. THE JEWISH CHARACTER OF THE STATE
Although there is a Jewish majority in the country, Judaism has not
been proclaimed the official religion of the State. Neither is Jewish law
the applicable legal system, except in certain matters of personal status of
Jews.
Some legal instruments, however, refer to the Jewish character of the
State. Thus, the 1948 Declaration on the Establishment of the State of
Israel proclaimed "the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel
[the Land of Israel] ... the State of Israel. ' ,4 Similarly, the Basic Law:
The Knesset, provides that:
[a] candidates' list shall not participate in elections to the
Knesset if its objects or actions, expressly or by implication, in-
clude one of the following:
(1) negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the
State of the Jewish people;
(2) negation of the democratic character of the State;
(3) incitement to racism.'
The Jewishness of the State is also reflected in the fact that the Sab-
bath and the Jewish holidays have been declared to be the official days of
rest for the majority of the population, that the flag and emblem express
Jewish tradition, and that the army has to provide only Kosher food to its
soldiers.'
Another interesting Jewish-oriented provision has been included in the
Law on the Foundations of Law, 5740-1980,' which deals with the filling
4. Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4, (1948).
5. Basic Law: The Knesset (Amendment No. 9), 39 L.S.I. 216, (1984-85) (adding sec-
tion 7A); see also Law on Political Parties, 1992, of section 5(1), 1991/92, S.H. 190. For an
interpretation of section 7A, see AMNON RUBINSTEIN & RHANAN HAR-ZAHAV, THE
BASIC LAW: THE KNESSET 57-65 (1993).
6. See AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 109-11 (5th ed. 1996) (Hebrew) (stating other relevant statutory
provisions as well as references).
7. Foundations of Law, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 181, (1979-80).
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of lacunae by the judges: "Where the court, faced with a legal question
requiring decision, finds no answer to it in statute law or case-law or by
analogy, it shall decide it in the light of the principles of freedom, justice,
equity and peace of Israel's heritage."8 The term Israel, in this context,
refers to Judaism, or the Jewish people.
Another relevant provision has been included in the two 1992 Basic
Laws on human rights mentioned above: their purpose is to protect the
rights dealt with by these laws, namely, human dignity, liberty, as well as
freedom of occupation, "in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of
the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state."9
Several authors have discussed the compatibility of the Jewishness and
the democratic character of the State;1° according to Supreme Court Jus-
tice 1. Zamir, there is no contradiction if both terms are interpreted rea-
sonably and moderately." In no official text has the Jewish character of
the State been defined.12 It should, however, be remembered that the
term "Jewish" has a religious as well as an ethnic connotation, and the
two aspects are interwoven. 3 It is almost impossible to make a clear dis-
tinction between them.
8. Id.; see also RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 6, at 79-80.
9. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90; Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1993/94, S.H. 90.
10. See AHARON BARAK, 3 INTERPRETATION IN LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTER-
PRETATION 328-47 (1994) (Hebrew); CLAUDE KLEIN, LA DItMOCRATIC D'ISRAEL 286-94
(1997); Haim Cohen, Values of a Jewish and Democratic State-Reflection on Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Freedom, in HA-PERAKLITr (JUBILEE BOOK) 9-52 (1993) (Hebrew);
Menahem Elon, Constitution by Legislation: The Values of a Jewish and Democratic State
in Light of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Personal Freedom, 17 TEL Aviv U. L. REV.
659 (1993) (Hebrew); Ruth Gavison, A Jewish and Democratic State-Political Identity,
Ideology and Law, 19 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 631 (1995) (Hebrew); Assa Kasher, A Jewish
and Democratic State-Philosophical Outline, 19 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 729 (1995) (He-
brew); Asher Maoz, The Values of a Jewish and Democratic Sate, 19 TEL AVIV U. L. REV.
547 (1995) (Hebrew); RALPH BINYAMIN NEUBERGER, RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
ISRAEL (1997) (Hebrew); Ariel Rozen-Zvi, A Jewish and Democratic State: Spiritual Par-
enthood, Alienation and Symbiosis-Can We Square the Circle?, 19 TEL Aviv U. L. REV.
479 (1995) (Hebrew).
11. See 1 ITZHAK ZAMIR, ADMINISTRATIVE POWER 47-48 (1996) (Hebrew).
12. As stated by BARAK, supra note 10, at 332.
13. See CLAUDE KLEIN, LE CARACTtRE JUIF DE L'ITAT D'ISRAEL 102 (1977).
[Vol. 47:441
Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel
IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND OF CONSCIENCE
14
The basic attitude of the State toward religious freedom and pluralism
is reflected in the 1948 Declaration on the Establishment of the State of
Israel: "[The State] will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, lan-
guage, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all re-
ligions ... ",," The Declaration is neither a constitution nor a statute, but
the Supreme Court has decided that it "expresses the nation's vision and
its credo," and should be taken into consideration "when we attempt to
interpret or clarify the laws of the State."' 6 Moreover, the legislature has
also recognized the relevance of the Declaration by including in the two
above mentioned 1992 Basic Laws a provision which says that "these
[fundamental human] rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles
set forth in the Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel.'
17
14. For background on freedom of religion in Israel, see generally S. ZALMAN
ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA: JEWISH RELIGION IN THE JEWISH STATE (1976);
KLEIN, supra note 10, at 229-64; RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 6, at 175-236; Zvi
Berinson, Freedom of Religion and Conscience in the State of Israel, 3 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
223-32 (1973); Izhak Englard, The Conflict Between State and Religion in Israel-Its His-
torical and Ideological Background, 19 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 741 (1995); Izhak Englard,
The Conflict Between State and Religion in Israel: Its Ideological Background, in
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE 219 (Menachem Mor ed., 1993)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES]; Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel,
35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185 (1987); Izhak Englard, Religious Freedom and Jewish Tradition in
Modern Israeli Law-A Clash of Ideologies, in RELIGION AND LAW: BIBLICAL-JUDAIC
AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES 365-75 (Edwin B. Firmage et al. eds., 1990); Stephen Gold-
stein, The Teaching of Religion in Government Funded Schools, 26 ISR. L. REV. 36 (1992);
Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 349-89 (Johan D. van der Vyver &
John Witte eds., 1996); Asher Maoz, State and Religion in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 247; Simha Meron, Freedom of Religion as Distinct from Free-
dom from Religion, 4 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 219 (1974); Amnon Rubinstein, State and Re-
ligion in Israel, in J. CONTEMP. HIST., Oct. 1967, at 107; Chamman Shelach, On Freedom
of Conscience and Freedom of the Heart: Freedom of Conscience and of Religion in Israel
and the Limitations on the Freedom to Marry, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL-ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF HAIM H. COHEN (Rut Gavison ed., 1982); Shimon Shetreet, A Rejoinder, 4
ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 241 (1974); Shimon Shetreet, Some Reflections on Freedom of Con-
science and Religion in Israel, 4 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 194 (1974).
15. Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4, (1948).
16. Election Appeal, 1/65, Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee
for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) P.D. 365, 386 (by J. Agranat).
17. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90; Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90. The full text of section 1 common to both Basic Laws as
amended reads:
Fundamental human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of
the human being, the sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are
free; these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the
Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel.
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In this context one should also refer to a legislative text enacted in
1922 at the time of the British Mandate, and which is still in force in Is-
rael:
All persons in Palestine [now Israel] shall enjoy full liberty of
conscience, and the free exercise of their forms of worship sub-
ject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. Each
religious community ... shall enjoy autonomy for the internal
affairs of the community subject to the provisions of any Ordi-
nance or Order issued by the High Commissioner."
As mentioned, the two 1992 Basic Laws deal specifically with "Human
Dignity and Liberty" and certain rights which derive therefrom, and with
"Freedom of Occupation." However, the general reference to "Funda-
mental Human Rights" in the context of "Basic Principles"' 9 may per-
haps be interpreted as a recognition of the applicability of other funda-
mental human rights, including freedom of religion, although not
specifically mentioned in the text. If this broad interpretation of the two
1992 Basic Laws is adopted by the Supreme Court, the result could be
that freedom of religion would, to a certain extent, prevail over regular
laws.20
Israel has also committed herself to freedom of belief and religion in
various international instruments. Thus, she has ratified the 1966 Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for relig-
ious freedom.2' Similarly, under the 1993 Fundamental Agreement be-
tween the Holy See and Israel, the latter has committed herself to uphold
and observe this freedom.22 This text also gives legally binding effect, as
Id.
18. Palestine Order in Council, 1922,3 DRAYTON, LAWS OF PALESTINE 2587, section
83 (1934).
19. See Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1993/94, S.H. 90; Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90.
20. See id. This would be the consequence of the provision in section 8 of the Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty: "The rights according to this Basic Law shall not be
violated except by a statute that befits the values of the State of Israel, and is enacted for a
worthy purpose, and to an extent that does not exceed what is necessary, or by regulation
enacted by virtue of express authorization in such a statute." Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90. However, the law has no retroactive effect: "Nothing in this
Basic Law affects the validity of any law (din) in force prior to the entry into force of this
Basic Law." Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1993/94, S.H. 90; see also
RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 6, at 176; Hillel Sommer, The Non-Enumerated
Rights: On the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution, 28 MISHPATIM 257, 324-26 (1997)
(Hebrew).
21. See ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 18. Israel ratified the Covenant in 1991.
22. See Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel, Dec.
30, 1993, Vatican-Isr., art. 1, 33 I.L.M. 153, 154 (1994) [hereinafter Fundamental Agree-
ment]; see also Marie-Pierre Lafranchi, L'Accord Fondamental du 30 dcembre 1993 sign6
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between the two contracting parties, to the relevant provision of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 3
Compliance with freedom of religion in Israel has been assured by the
criminal law which made it a punishable offence to outrage religious sen-
timents, to disturb worship, or to desecrate places of worship.24 The
above mentioned rights, and the protection of criminal law, have been
granted to "all religions," without distinction.
The Supreme Court of Israel has recognized and implemented the
principle of freedom of religion in various cases. In Faithful of the Tem-
ple Mount v. Commander of Police in the Jerusalem Area,25 Justice Barak
said:
Every person in Israel enjoys freedom of conscience, of be-
lief, of religion, and of worship. This freedom is guaranteed to
every person in every enlightened democratic regime, and
therefore it is guaranteed to every person in Israel. It is one of
the fundamental principles upon which the State of Israel is
based .... This freedom is partly based on Article 83 of the
Palestine Order in Council of 1922, and partly it is one of those
"fundamental rights which 'are not written in the book' but de-
rive directly from the nature of our State as a peace-loving
democratic State" .... On the basis of these rules-and in ac-
cordance with the Declaration of Independence-every law and
every power will be interpreted as recognizing freedom of con-
science, of belief, of religion and of worship .... 26
However, freedom of religion is not an absolute right. It is subject to
limitations and derogations. Thus, Israel's Supreme Court said that:
entre le Saint-Siege et Israel, 40 ANNUAIRE FRANQAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 326
(1994).
23. See Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 18. Originally, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the Declaration "as a common standard of achievement" to
which people should strive. Id. preamble. Opinions are divided on whether it has later
acquired binding legal force. Its provision on religious freedom is referred to in the Fun-
damental Agreement as follows: "The State of Israel ... affirms its continuing commit-
ment to uphold and observe the human right to freedom of religion and conscience, as set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other international instruments
to which it is a party." Fundamental Agreement, supra note 22, art. 1(1).
24. See Offences Against Sentiments of Religion and Tradition, 1977, Penal Law, sec-
tions 170-74, Special Volume L.S.I. 54, 54-55, (1977); see also SHMUEL BERKOVITZ, THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE HOLY PLACES IN JERUSALEM 28-37 (1997) (Hebrew) (providing
a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions).
25. H.C. 292/83, 38(2) P.D. 449, 454.
26. Id. (internal quotation from Landau J. in H.C. 243/62, 16 P.D. 2407); see also H.C.
7128/96, Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount v. Government of Israel, (not yet
published) ("Solomon's Stables" case).
19981
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Freedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is a rela-
tive one. It has to be balanced with other rights and interests
which also deserve protection, like private and public property,
and freedom of movement. One of the interests to be taken into
consideration is public order and security.27
Not every concern for public order justifies a restriction on freedom of
religion and of worship. Only if the danger to public order is very prob-
able or almost certain may the authorities restrict this freedom.28 The
relevant case concerned the refusal of the police to allow a group of Jews
to pray outside the Temple Mount near one of its gates on the anniver-
sary of the unification of Jerusalem, because of an alleged danger to
public order. The Court rejected the police's argument and ordered the
police to permit the holding of the prayers under certain conditions.
This limitation on freedom of religion is in line with the provisions of
the relevant international documents. Thus, Article 29(2) of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[i]n the exercise
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law solely for the purpose of... meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.,
29
Similarly, under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, "[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others."3 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court of Israel has
emphasized that it recognizes and sanctions not only freedom of religion,
but also freedom from religion, namely, the freedom not to practice any
religion1
An interesting question concerning freedom of religion has been raised
in several bigamy cases. In Israel, bigamy is forbidden by penal law but it
is permitted according to Islamic law and according to the custom of sev-
eral Jewish communities. In some cases, people accused of bigamy tried
to defend themselves by claiming that the law against bigamy was con-
trary to the principle of freedom of worship. The Supreme Court has
rejected this argument by making a distinction between what religion al-
27. H.C. 292/83, Faithful of the Temple Mount, 38(2) P.D. at 455.
28. See id. at 456.
29. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, Article 29(2).
30. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 18(3), at 178.
31. See, e.g., H.C. 3872/93, Meatrael Ltd. v. The Prime Minister and Minister of Re-
ligious Affairs, 47(5) P.D. 485,506.
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lows, on the one hand, and what it commands, on the other hand. Since
bigamy is, at the most, allowed by the relevant religious laws and not
commanded, its outlawing by the secular legislature is not contrary to the
freedom of worship.32
V. THE HOLY PLACES
Freedom of religion also implies certain rights with regard to the Holy
Places, namely, freedom of access and of worship, as well as the protec-
tion of those places. The Holy Places have often been a source of con-
flicts.33 In the nineteenth century a bitter controversy arose when certain
European countries extended their protection over the various Christian
churches in Palestine, and over the places which were holy to them. In
order to regulate the status of the different churches at the Holy Places,
the Ottoman government promulgated a number of firmans, the most
important one being that of 1852. 4 That firman dealt with certain Holy
Places and determined the powers and rights of the various denomina-
tions in those places. That arrangement became known as the historical
status quo." The status quo has been applied to the Church of the Holy
Sepulcher and its dependencies, the Convent of Deir al-Sultan, the Sanc-
tuary of the Ascension on the Mount of Olives, and the Tomb of the Vir-
gin Mary near Gethsemane, all four in Jerusalem, as well as to the
Church of the Nativity, the Milk Grotto, and the Shepherds' Field near
Bethlehem.
32. See, e.g., Cr.A. 112/50, Yossipoff v. Attorney General, 5 P.D. 481; H.C. 49/54,
Malham v. Sharia Judge in Acre, 8 P.D. 910; Cr.A. 338/74, State of Israel v. Rubin, 29(1)
P.D. 166.
33. See generally Shmuel Berkovitz, The Legal Status of the Holy Places in Israel 8-30
(1978) (unpublished thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. to the Hebrew University)
(available at Harvard Law School); see also WALTER ZANDER, ISRAEL AND THE HOLY
PLACES OF CHRISTENDOM (1971).
34. English translation reproduced in ZANDER, supra note 33, at 178-80.
35. See generally L.G.A. CUST, THE STATUS QUO IN THE HOLY PLACES (1980);
ZANDER, supra note 33, at 53-54; Izhak Englard, The Legal Status of the Holy Places in
Jerusalem, 28 ISR. L. REV, 589, 591-93 (1994); see also Berkovitz, supra note 33, at 35-45.
The historical status quo should be distinguished from the term "status quo" used in the
context of relations between secular and religious Jews in Israel. In this context, the term
means compromise arrangements on matters concerning the Jewish faith such as respect
for the precepts of Judaism in public places and in the army, safeguarding the rights of the
religious establishment, and application of religious law in marriage and divorce proceed-
ings. See ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, THE POLITICS OF ACCOMODATION: SETTLING CON-
FLICTS OF STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL 31-67 (1997) (Hebrew); H.C. 5016/96, Lior
Horev v. Minister of Transport, English summary published in 14 JUSTICE 34 (1997).
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The status quo obtained international recognition by the 1856 Confer-
ence of Paris after the Crimean War and by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin.36
It has also been reconfirmed by the 1993 Fundamental Agreement be-
tween the Holy See and Israel 7
The 1922 Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine,38 drafted by the
Council of the League of Nations, also dealt with the Holy Places. The
Mandatory power was requested to preserve existing rights in those
places and to ensure free access and worship, subject to requirements of
public order and decorum. An international commission which was "to
study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the
Holy Places" was never established due to lack of agreement among the
Powers about its composition. 9
In 1924, Britain adopted the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council
under which "no cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places or
religious buildings or sites in Palestine or the rights or claims relating to
the different religious communities in Palestine shall be heard or deter-
mined by any Court in Palestine."'4 Although the Order in Council does
not say so expressly, these matters were to be handled by the British
High Commissioner (today the Minister of Religious Affairs).41
36. See Treaty for the Settlement of Affairs in the East, 13 July 1878, art. 62, 153
CONSOL. T.S. 172, 190 (1878).
37. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 22, art. 4.
38. Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine Confirmed by the Council of the
League of Nations, 24 July 1922, reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS
RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 25-32 (Ruth Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch eds.,
1992).
39. Id. at 28; ZANDER, supra note 33, at 64-70.
40. The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council, 25 July 1924, 3, DRAYTON, LAWS
OF PALESTINE 2625 (1934). In implementing this provision, the courts had to deal with
the question, what is a Holy Place. The courts have generally held that, in the absence of a
definition in the Order in Council, it may be presumed that the intention was that the ho-
liness depends on the belief of members of the relevant group, namely, on their religion.
See Berkovitz, supra note 33, at 410-91; see also Haim Cohen, The Status of Jerusalem in
the Israel Legal System, in TWENTY YEARS IN JERUSALEM 1967-1987, at 246, 258-61
(Joshua Prawer & Ora Ahimeir eds., 1988).
41. See Shmuel Berkovitz, The Holy Places in Jerusalem: Legal Aspects (Part Two),
12 JUSTICE 17, 17-19 (1997) (discussing jurisdictional issues). According to Justice
Agranat, the President of the Supreme Court, in H.C. 222/68, National Groups-A Regis-
tered Association v. Minister of Police, 24(2) P.D. 141, 203, 211, the authority of the Man-
datory power derived from the Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, supra note 38,
and from the purpose of the Order in Council. In Israel it is also based on Basic Law: The
Government of 1968, Section 29, which grants the Government all powers not given to
another organ. In the later, 1992 version of this Basic Law, the relevant provision is in sec-
tion 40.
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The 1936 Criminal Law Ordinance42 by which the Mandatory codified
the penal law in Palestine, includes several provisions on the protection
of Places of Worship against desecration. These provisions are today in-
cluded in Israel's Penal Law. 3 In 1948 the State of Israel was established,
and, as mentioned earlier, the Declaration signed at that time by the
leaders of the Jewish community included a provision on the safeguard-
ing of the Holy Places of all religions."
Until 1967, most of the Holy Places in the territory of former manda-
tory Palestine were under Jordanian control. However, as a result of the
1967 Six-Day War, they came under the administration of Israel. Imme-
diately after the fighting ended, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol convened
the spiritual leaders of the various communities and reassured them of
Israel's intention to protect all the Holy Places and to permit free wor-
ship. Soon the Knesset adopted the Protection of the Holy Places
Law,46 which ensures protection of the Holy Places against desecration as
well as freedom of access thereto. These principles were reconfirmed
with regard to Holy Places situated in Jerusalem by the 1980 Basic Law:
Jerusalem Capital of Israel.47 The details of the implementation with re-
gard to Jewish Holy Places were laid down by the Regulations enacted
by the Minister of Religious Affairs in accordance with the protection of
the Holy Places Law.48 In addition, one has to remember that there are
certain provisions dealing with the Holy Places in various specific laws,
such as the Mining Ordinance of 19254' and the Antiquities Law 1978.50
In order to complete the picture, one should mention certain interna-
tional texts related to the Holy Places. We have already mentioned the
42. See 1936 PALESTINE GAZETTE, Supp. 1,285.
43. See Offences Against Sentiments of Religion and Tradition, Penal Law, 1977, sec-
tions 170-74, Special Volume L.S.I. 54, (1977); see also Shmuel Berkovitz, The Holy Places
in Jerusalem: Legal Aspects (Part One), 11 JUSTICE 4, 7-9 (1996) (analyzing the relevant
provisions).
44. See Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4,
(1948).
45. See Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's Address to the Spiritual Leaders of All Com-
munities in Jerusalem (June 7, 1967), reprinted in 1 ISRAEL'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 1947-
1974, at 244-45 (Meron Medzini ed., 1976).
46. See The Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967, 21 L.S.I. 76, (1966-67).
47. See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, of 1980, 34 L.S.I. 209, (1979-80).
48. See Regulations on the Protection of Places Holy for Jews, 1980/81, K.T. 4252,
1212 (amended in 1989/90, K.T. 5237, 190).
49. See The Mining Ordinance of 1925, 2 DRAYTON, LAWS OF PALESTINE 938-39
(1934).
50. See The Antiquities Law, 1978, section 29(c), 32 L.S.I. 93, 100 (1978);
BERKOVITZ, supra note 24, at 27 (for additional provisions, and for an analysis); see also
Berkovitz, supra note 43, at 6.
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1993 Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and Israel which
deals both with the preservation of the historical status quo in those
Christian Holy Places to which it applies, and with the protection of
freedom of Catholic worship at others." In the 1994 Treaty of Peace be-
tween Israel and Jordan, Israel promised to "[respect] the present special
role of... Jordan in Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem," and "[w]hen
negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high
priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.
'5 2
With regard to the Palestinians, one should mention a letter sent by
then Foreign Minister of Israel Shimon Peres to the Foreign Minister of
Norway in October 1993. The letter was kept secret for some time, and
its discovery aroused much criticism in Israel. According to this letter,
"all the Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem, including the eco-
nomic, social, educational, cultural, and the holy Christian and Moslem
places, are performing an essential task for the Palestinian population
." and "will be preserved .... The meaning of this text and its effect
raise difficult questions of interpretation. 4
Freedom of access and of worship at the Holy Sites in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, as well as the protection of those sites, have been dealt
with by the 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area,55 by
the 1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip,56 and by the 1997 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment
in Hebron. 7 How do courts in Israel deal with disputes in which Holy
Places are involved? We have seen above that the principles of freedom
of religion and of worship are generally recognized. Moreover, no seri-
ous disputes have erupted with regard to freedom of access and of wor-
ship in places that are holy for only one religion or denomination. How-
51. See Fundamental Agreement, supra note 22, art. 4.
52. Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan, 26 Oct. 1994, art. 9, 34 I.L.M. 43 (1995).
53. Full text reprinted in JERUSALEM POST, June 7, 1994, at 1.
54. See Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem and the Peace Process, 28 ISR. L. REV. 402, 428-30
(1994) (analyzing the text of the letter); see also SAMI F. MUSALLAM, THE STRUGGLE
FOR JERUSALEM: A PROGRAMME OF ACrION FOR PEACE 37-48 (1996) (on the back-
ground to the sending of the letter).
55. See Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area between Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organization, 4 May 1994, U.N. Doc. A149/180-S/1994/727 (Annex),
of 20 June 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 622 (1994).
56. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
K.A. 33, 1, reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 551 (1997) (excerpts).
57. See Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron and Note for the Record,
17 Jan. 1997, 36 I.L.M. 650 (1997); see also Ruth Lapidoth, The Holy Places and Palestin-
ian Self-Government (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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ever, in recent years, disputes, sometimes accompanied by violence, have
erupted among various Jewish denominations, in particular with regard
to prayer at the Western Wall.58 Most disputes concern places that are
holy to two or more religions or denominations. The attitude of the
courts may be summarized as follows: the 1924 Palestine (Holy Places)
Order in Council 9 is still in force except where it has been superseded by
later Israeli legislation, like the 1967 Protection of the Holy Places Law.
60
Therefore, the courts will not decide questions of rights and claims to
"Holy Places, religious buildings or sites." 61 Similarly, in principle, courts
do not consider themselves authorized to adjudicate on matters related
to the implementation of the right to worship at Holy Places.62 It is the
government that has to deal both with disputes about rights to Holy
Places and with the modalities of worship. Thus, the Supreme Court has
so far refused to intervene in order to ensure the right of Jews to pray in
groups on the Temple Mount, which is holy to both Jews and Muslims,
and is under the administrative control of the Muslim Waqf.
63
On the other hand, the courts consider themselves authorized to deal
with all matters mentioned in the Protection of the Holy Places Law,
64
namely, protection against desecration, against violation of freedom of
access, and against violations of the feelings of the members of a com-
munity with regard to the place which is sacred for them.6' The courts
58. See, e.g., H.C. 257/89, 2410/90, Hoffman v. Custodian of the Western Wall, 48(2)
P.D. 256 (considering a dispute over the rights of worship and prayer at the Western Wall
between Jews of different religious convictions).
59. The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council of 25 July 1924, 3 DRAYTON, LAWS
OF PALESTINE 2625 (1934).
60. See Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967, 21 L.S.I. 76, (1966-67) (which partly su-
perseded the Order in Council).
61. The Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Council of July 25, 1924, 3 DRAYTON,
LAWS OF PALESTINE 2625 (1934). For a famous interesting case, see H.C. 109/70, Coptic
Orthodox Mutteran of the Holy Seat in Jerusalem and the Near East v. Minister of Police,
25(1) P.D. 225, 225; H.C. 188/77, Coptic Orthodox Mutteran of the Holy Seat in Jerusalem
and the Near East v. Government of Israel, 33(1) P.D. 225,225.
62. See, e.g., H.C. 222/68, National Groups-A Registered Association v. Minister of
Police, 24(2) P.D. 141; H.C. 33/92, Baruch Ben-Yosef v. Minister for Religious Affairs,
46(1) P.D. 855; H.C. 537/81, Hayim Stanger v. Government of Israel, 35(4) P.D. 673.
63. The special difficulty with the Temple Mount is that it is not only holy for Jews as
well as Muslims, but it has also become a national symbol for both communities. See
YITZHAK REITER, THE TEMPLE MOUNT/AL-HARAM AL-SHARIF: POINTS OF
AGREEMENT AND DISPUTE 2 (1997) (Hebrew); NADAV SHRAGAI, THE TEMPLE MOUNT
CONFLICT (1995) (Hebrew).
64. See The Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967, 21 L.S.I. 76, (1966-67).
65. For an analysis of these notions, and the relations among them, see H.C. 7128/96,
Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount v. Government of Israel (Justice I. Zamir)
(not yet published) ("Solomon's Stables" Case).
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are also authorized to deal with criminal offences in order to preserve
public order at the Holy Places.6 Even where a dispute actually relates
to claims or rights to a Holy Site, the courts may intervene in order to re-
store possession to a community if it had been deprived of this possession
by a recent act.67 The reason for this rule is that the courts have an obli-
gation to preserve law and order.
This last consideration-the preservation of law and order-is so im-
portant that in some cases the Supreme Court has even refused to over-
ride a decision of the police to deny freedom of mere access (independ-
ent of worship) because of the fear that such access would jeopardize law
and order. Thus, in certain cases individual Jews were denied access to
the Temple Mount for reasons of public order. 68 Moreover, even a tem-
porary complete prohibition for all Jews to ascend the Mount may be
lawful if needed for reasons of safety.69
An interesting question concerns the distinction between the right to
worship at Holy Places, which according to the courts is not within their
jurisdiction, and the right to access with which the courts are authorized
to deal. The request of Jews for permission to pray in a group on the
Temple Mount was considered a matter of worship,7 but it seems that
according to the Supreme Court the right of an individual to pray by
71himself is part of his right of access.
66. See, e.g., Cr. C. (Jm.) 2986/87, Government of Israel v. The Idra Institutions and
Rabbi Goren, 1988/89(2) P.M. 156 (Justice Proccacia), and the petition to the Supreme
Court-H.C. 267/88, The Idra Institutions and Rabbi Goren v. The Local Court in Jeru-
salem and the Government of Israel, 43 (3) P.D. 728 (Justice Barak); Cr. C. (Jm.) 203/84,
State of Israel v. Livni 1989/90(3) P.M. 330 (the case of the Jewish underground); Cr. C.
(Jm.) 51/76, State of Israel v. Chanan, 1976/77(l) P.M. 392. In principle, the courts may
deal with criminal cases related to the Holy Places unless the offence is directly connected
with the sanctity of the place where it was perpetrated. But so far in no criminal case have
the courts abstained from assuming jurisdiction because of such a connection.
67. See, e.g., H.C. 109/70, Coptic Orthodox Mutteran of the Holy Seat in Jerusalem
and the Near East v. Minister of Police, 25(1) P.D. 225, 225.
68. See, e.g., H.C. 2725/93, Salomon v. Commander of the Police in Jerusalem, 96(1)
Takdeen-Elyon 370; H.C. 4044/93, Salomon v. Commander of the Police in Jerusalem,
96(1) Takdeen-Elyon 447. In both cases the Supreme Court decided by majority vote, and
not unanimously.
69. See H.C. 1663/94, Salomon v. Police Officer Givati, 94(1) Takdeen-Elyon 1078.
70. See, e.g., H.C. 222/68, National Groups-A Registered Association v. Minister of
Police, 24(2) P.D. 141; H.C. 33/92, Baruch Ben-Yosef v. Minister for Religious Affairs,
46(1) P.D. 855; H.C. 537/81, Hayim Stanger, adv. v. Government of Israel, 35(4) P.D. 673.
71. See H.C. 67/93, "Kach" Movement v. The Minister for Religious Affairs, 47(2)
P.D. 1, 6 (recognizing that the right of an individual to pray by himself is a part of his right
of access, but refusing to implement this right under the circumstances due to police fear
that prayer with a prayer shawl may cause provocation); see also Izhak Englard, The Legal
Status of the Holy Places in Jerusalem, 28 ISR. L. REV. 595, 597 n.24 (1994) (stating that
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An overall consideration of the courts has been that there is a pre-
sumption in favor of the courts having jurisdiction, and that "where there
are two possible interpretations, the interpretation which should be cho-
sen is the one which preserves jurisdiction and not the one which ex-
cludes it.
72
Even in those cases where the courts do have jurisdiction, they exercise
it with great caution:
There are certain matters, in the sphere of law, which are
also matters of society, faith, morals and policy. In such matters
the Court is apt to decide not strictly according to the law, but it
may interpret and implement the law flexibly, in accordance
with non-legal considerations, if the public welfare requires it.
Such are, usually, matters related to the Holy Places.73
The Holy Places in Israel are administered by members of the faith for
whom those places are holy. In practice, Israel has been very careful to
carry out the policy of respect for the Holy Places of all religions. At the
entrance of each Holy Place the Ministry of Religious Affairs has posted
an announcement in several languages requesting visitors not to dese-
crate the place, to be properly dressed, and to behave becomingly. In the
few cases of violations of the sanctity of Holy Places, the police have
acted diligently to apprehend the offenders and bring them to justice.
Sometimes it is difficult to strike the right balance between the grant-
ing of autonomy to the administrators of the Holy Places on the one
hand, and assuring adequate protection on the other hand. Too much
protection might be interpreted as interference.
VI. EQUALITY OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS OF MEMBERS OF
VARIOUS RELIGIONS AND COMMUNITIES
Discrimination on grounds of religion or belief would certainly be con-
trary to religious freedom, and Israel's legislation and court decisions
would not tolerate it. The Declaration on the Establishment of the State
proclaimed that "[the State of Israel] will ensure complete equality of so-
cial and political rights to all its inhabitants, irrespective of religion, race
or sex .... 14 An interesting example demonstrating this equality is the
provision in the Basic Law: The President of the State of 1964 which lays
"freedom of access without freedom of worship is an absurdity").
72. H.C. 267/88, The Idra Institutions and Rabbi Goren v. The Local Court in Jeru-
salem and the Government of Israel, 43(3) P.D. 728,742.
73. H.C. 7128/96, Movement of the Faithful of the Temple Mount v. Government of
Israel (unpublished), at p.3, § 2 of typed text.
74. Declaration on the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, (1948).
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down only two conditions for a person to qualify as a candidate for this
office: he must be a citizen and a resident of Israel.75 An amendment
proposed at the time, which would have reserved this office for Jews, was
not adopted by the Knesset.
According to the Supreme Court, the general principle of equality is a
basic value of the legal system of Israel. It is a central ingredient of the
social consensus on which Israel's society is based." This principle im-
plies that any differentiation must be justified by the nature of the case
and its circumstances. 7 Such differentiation exists, for instance, in mat-
ters of military service. Only Jews and Druze citizens have been subject
to compulsory service in the army. The special treatment given to most
non-Jews in this respect was designed to prevent a conflict of conscience,
most of the non-Jews being Arabs (Muslim or Christian), who may have
close relatives in countries which are not yet at peace with Israel. How-
ever, many non-Jewish youths serve in the Israeli army on a voluntary
basis. Respect for religious pluralism is at the base of various laws which
reject automatic equality in order to preserve the identity and tradition
of a religious community. Thus, the Adoption of Children Law pre-
scribes that the adopting persons be of the same religion as the adoptee.7 s
In the matter of weekly rest, it is provided that non-Jews may choose
Sunday or Friday instead of Saturday, which is the Jewish Sabbath.79
It is of course true that equality cannot be measured only by reference
to the legal system, and some inequality on the social level may exist de-
spite the law. But it seems that in hardly any heterogeneous society are
social relations between members of the various groups based on com-
plete equality. Moreover, in Israel this lack of full social equality and in-
termingling has probably been compounded by the political element. As
mentioned, most of Israel's non-Jews are ethnically Arabs, and some
suspicion or distrust may have resulted from their affinity with the peo-
ple in some neighboring areas who are still hostile towards Israel.
Among the specific provisions of Israel's laws which are intended to
guarantee equality to members of the various religions, let us mention
75. See Basic Law: The President of the State of 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111, (1963-64).
76. See e.g., H.C. 721/94, El-Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Danilevitz, 48(5) P.D. 749, 759.
77. See id. at 761; see also the general comment on discrimination prepared by the
Human Rights Committee established under the ICCPR, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.
1/Add. 1 (1989), para. 13.
78. Adoption of Children Law, 1981, 35 L.S.I. 360, (1980-81). In December 1997 the
law was amended in order to permit adoption of children from abroad even if they are not
of the same religion as the adopting parents.
79. See Hours of Work and Rest Law, 1951,5 L.S.I. 125, (1950-51).
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the law on the Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment), 0 the
Employment Service Law,8' the Succession Law,8' and the Defamation
Law." Equality among the members of various ethnic groups and faiths
has to be supplemented by provisions against intolerance. But a prohibi-
tion of intolerance may easily be interpreted as a violation of the princi-
ple of freedom of opinion and of expression, which is the cornerstone of
every democratic society. Hence the legislature interferes only when the
intolerance reaches the level of incitement. Thus, in the Penal Law,8 the
offence of sedition includes the promotion of feelings of ill-will and en-
mity between different sections of the population. The law also prohibits
the publication or reproduction of publications of a seditious nature. Se-
dition is considered a serious offence, and the perpetrator is liable to up
81to five years imprisonment. In this context one should also refer to the
exclusion from elections to the Knesset of parties whose objectives or ac-
tions entail incitement to racism,86 and to the general prohibition of in-
citement to racism. 7 Despite these legal provisions, incitement to hatred
on religious or ethnic grounds occurs among members of some extremist
groups, and one may deplore that the State, despite its efforts, has not
been more diligent in prosecuting the offenders.
It has been alleged that there is discrimination against non-Jews in the
fields of immigration and nationality. The Declaration on the Estab-
lishment of the State has stated that "The State of Israel will be open to
Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles ... .", Conse-
quently, the Law of Return provides that "every Jew has the right to im-
migrate to the country,"'89 and according to the Nationality Law, he may
easily acquire Israeli nationality unless he does not wish soit However,
80. The Crime of Genocide (Prevention and Punishment) Law, 1950, 4 L.S.I. 101,
(1949-50).
81. Employment Service Law, 1959, section 42(a), 13 L.S.I. 29, (1958-59).
82. Succession Law, 1965, section 143, 19 L.S.I. 58, (1964-65).
83. Defamation Law, 1965, section 1, 19 L.S.I. 254, (1964-65).
84. Penal Law, 1977, Penal Law, sections 133-37, Special Volume L.S.I. 44-45, (1977).
85. See id. sections 145, 198, 170-74 (including provisions on unlawful associations,
public mischief, and offences against sentiments of religion and tradition).
86. See 39 L.S.I. 216, (1984-85), quoted in text accompanying supra note 5.
87. See Penal Law (Amendment No. 20), 1986, 40 L.S.I. 230, (1985-86) (adding sec-
tions 144a to 144e to the Penal Law).
88. 1 L.S.I. 4, (1948).
89. See 4 L.S.I. 114, (1949-50). This right may be refused to a person engaged in ac-
tivity directed against the Jewish people, a person who endangers the public health, and a
person with a criminal past liable to endanger public welfare.
90. See 6 L.S.I. 50, (1951-52); see also Claude Klein, La nationalite israelienne, in
JURISCLASSEUR (1983).
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this privilege does not involve improper discrimination on religious
grounds for several reasons.
(1) When a people attains statehood in fulfillment of its aspiration for
national liberation, it is common and natural that all members of that
people are permitted and invited to come and live in that country.9'
From this point of view, Israel is no more discriminatory than most other
new States. In fact, many States, new and old, have granted preference,
for the purpose of bestowing their nationality, to persons who have close
social, cultural, or ethnic links with the nation. Examples include
Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, the former USSR, Italy, for-
mer Czechoslovakia, Denmark, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Li-
beria, Mexico, Nicaragua, Poland, Venezuela, and Jordan.9
(2) In 1965, the United Nations adopted the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,93 which has
been in force among more than 140 States, including Israel. Although
this document deals with racial discrimination, 94 it seems that by analogy
one can draw some important conclusions with regard to restrictions or
preferences on religious grounds as well. The Convention has laid down
that in matters of nationality, citizenship, and naturalization, States are
free to prefer certain persons, on condition that there is no discrimina-
tion against any particular group (Article 1(3)). Since Israeli legislation
does not impose restrictions on any particular group, it is within the let-
ter and the spirit of the Convention.
(3) Moreover the Convention permits the granting of preferences, if
necessary, to undo the effects of prior discrimination, namely, affirmative
action (Article 1(4)). In the case of Israel, one has to remember that
since 1939 the gates of Mandatory Palestine had almost been closed to
Jewish immigration, thus contributing to the perishing of millions of Jews
in Europe during World War II. The wide opening of the gates for Jews
91. See Assa Kasher, Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of
Return, 15 1SR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 101,110-12 (1985).
92. See LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Legislative Series, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/4 (1954), at 111, 123, 188, 198-99, 215-16, 217, 228, 288, 311, 351, 354, 387,
544-45 (referring to Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Jor-
dan, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, and Venezuela, respectively); see also
De Castro, Nationalitg, double nationalitg et supra-nationalitg, 102 R.C.A.D.I. 521, at 566-
68 (1961).
93. Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 211.
94. The term racial discrimination has a very comprehensive meaning for the purpose
of this Convention: "[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin .... " Id. at 195.
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on the establishment of Israel can thus be considered a lawful case of af-
firmative action.
(4) It should be underlined that the law does not close the State's
doors to anybody, but only creates a preference in favor of Jews.9 With
regard to non-Jews, the applicable rules of immigration are quite similar
to those that exist in other States. Everybody, including non-Jews, may
apply for permission to enter Israel, and for naturalization. It is only the
automatic right to enter and the easy acquisition of nationality that is re-
served for Jews.
(5) Moreover, not only do Jews enjoy those rights, but also family
members, whether they be Jewish or not.96
In the matter of immigration and nationality, the dual nature of Juda-
ism, as a religion and as an ethnic origin, is of particular relevance. De-
spite the semi-religious definition of a Jew, the relevant laws are basically
concerned with the return of members of the Jewish people to their
homeland. This right involves a continuing debate over the question,
"Who is a Jew?"-a matter which is beyond the scope of this article.9
VII. THE RIGHT TO CHANGE ONE'S RELIGION
Another aspect of religious freedom concerns the possibility to change
one's religion. This right has been the subject of a special enactment
adopted during the mandatory period, the Religious Community
(Change) Ordinance, of 1927,98 which is still in force. Since-as will be
seen later-belonging to a religious community has important conse-
quences in matters of personal status and the jurisdiction of the courts, it
was laid down that a change of religion has to be registered. Thus, ev-
eryone is free to change his religion, but in order for that conversion to
have legal consequences, and only for that purpose, 99 he needs the con-
95. See Natan Lerner, Equality of Rights Under Israeli Law, 9 PATTERNS OF
PREJUDICE 1, 3 (1975); see also KLEIN, supra note 13, at 35.
96. Law of Return (amendment no. 2), 1970, adding section 4A, 24 L.S.I. 28, (1969-
70).
97. See on this question, for example, RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 6, at 111-
31; AVNER H. SHAKI, WHO IS A JEW IN THE LAW OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1976-1978)
(two volumes) (Hebrew); M. Shava, Comments on the Law of Return (Amendment no. 2),
5730-1970 (Who is a Jew), 3 TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 140 (1977) (Hebrew).
98. 2 DRAYTON, LAWS OF PALESTINE 1294 (1934).
99. The Supreme Court has decided that the requirement of the consent of the head
of the new religious community is relevant only for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the
religious tribunals. See H.C. 1031/93, Pesachu Goldstein v. Minister of the Interior, 51(4)
P.D. 661. The case arose because the authorized orthodox Rabbinate had not recognized
a conversion to Judaism effected by the petitioner before a tribunal of the Conservative
movement.
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sent of the new religious community which he joins. The head of this re-
ligious community will provide him with an appropriate certificate, and
he has to notify the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the change. The
consent of the community which he leaves is not needed.'00 The religion
of a minor shall not be changed unless both of his parents consent or with
a court's approval, and if the minor is above the age of ten, his consent is
also required 1'
VIII. PROSELYTIZING
It is doubtful whether a right to proselytize is included in the principle
of freedom of religion. The above mentioned international instruments
provide for the right to manifest one's religion or belief "in teaching,
practice, worship and observance, '"' ° but proselytizing is not mentioned.
Nevertheless, we will add a few clarifications on this matter.
Proselytizing is legal in Israel, but since 1977 it has been prohibited to
promise money or other material advantages in order to induce someone
to change his religion. Similarly, it is prohibited to receive material ad-
vantages in exchange for a promise to change one's religion.'3
100. See Pinhas Shifman, Religious Affiliation in Israeli Interreligious Law, 15 ISR. L.
REV. 1, 15-40 (1980) (exploring issues of change in religious affiliation); Menashe Shava,
The Legal Aspects of Change of Religious Community in Israel, 3 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
256, 256-59 (1973).
101. Capacity and Guardianship Law, 1962, 16 L.S.I. 106, 108, (1961-62), as amended
by Capacity and Guardianship (Amendment) Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 113, (1964-65) (adding
section 13A to the original statute).
102. Universal Declaration, supra note 2, art. 18; see also ICCPR, supra note 2, at 172
(containing a similar provision: "to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching"); see Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, supra note 1, art. 6; THE DOCUMENT
OF THE COPENHAGEN MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (1990), art. 9(4), 29
I.L.M. 1306 (1990). The question may be raised, what is the difference, or what is the
boundary, between teaching and proselytizing. See, however, the case of Kokkinakis v.
Greece decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1993, 260 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser.
A) 18 (1993), discussed in T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the
European Convention on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 305-30 (Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr.
eds., 1996); see also Alain Garay, Libertg Religieuse et Pros~lytisme: l'exp~rience eu-
rop~enne, 17 REVUE TRIMESTIELLE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 7-29 (1994); Moshe
Hirsch, The Freedom of Proselytism Under the Fundamental Agreement and International
Law, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 407 (1998).
103. See Penal Law Amendment (Enticement to Change Religion) Law, 1977, 32
L.S.I. 62, (1977-78) (adding sections 174A and 174B); see also Ruth Levush, Israel Status
Report on the Anti-Proselytization Bill, LAW LIBRARY SCOPE TOPICS, NO. 10 (June 1997).
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It should be underlined that missionary activity is allowed, but the
buying of souls for money has been prohibited. It has also been con-
demned by various religions. This law applies equally to all religions.
According to an instruction issued by the Attorney General, no one shall
be prosecuted under this law without prior authorization by the State At-
torney. In fact, the law has never been applied.
From time to time, tensions rise as a result of overzealous attempts to
proselytize, probably because of the differing attitudes of the various re-
ligions to proselytizing: for instance, the Jewish and the Druze religions
do not encourage people to join their ranks, while some Christian groups
consider proselytizing a holy mission. It is understandable that members
of a religion, who do not try to influence others to join it, are irritated if
members of other religions try to proselytize among its own ranks.
As a reaction to the mailing of Christian literature to one-half million
Israeli homes by an American evangelical organization in San Diego,
some members of the Knesset proposed bills in 1997 that would limit
missionary activity in Israel. At the time this article was written, it was
unknown whether (and if so in what terms) these bills would ever be
adopted. The government of Israel has declared that it strongly objects
to them.
IX. THE RIGHT TO A RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
The right to religious education is guaranteed by law.'O It is essentially
based on governmental support, while recognizing the autonomy of the
various religious communities. The parents of a child may choose to
send him to a secular state school, to a religious state school, or to a pri-
vate religious school.' 5 In this context it should also be mentioned that
the 1989 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child was ratified by Is-
rael on August 4, 1991.
X. MATFERS OF PERSONAL STATUS
It is perhaps in matters of personal status that religious freedom in Is-
rael is most complicated and controversial. Under Ottoman rule (1517-
1917), the recognized religious communities (Millets) were granted
autonomy in matters of personal status. This system was taken over with
104. The main enactments in this field are Compulsory Education Law, 1949, 3 L.S.I.
125, (1948-49); State Education Law, 1953, 7 L.S.I. 113, (1952-53); see also KLEIN, supra
note 13, at 133-34.
105. See generally Goldstein, supra note 14.
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some modifications by the Mandatory authorities"" and later by the State
of Israel. Today there are, besides the Jewish community, thirteen Rec-
ognized Religious Communities in Israel: the Muslim, Eastern Orthodox,
Latin Catholic, Gregorian Armenian, Armenian Catholic, Syrian Catho-
lic, Chaldean Uniate, Greek Catholic-Melkite, Maronite, Syrian Ortho-
dox, Druze (since 1962), Episcopal-Evangelical (since 1970) and Baha'i
(since 1971) communities. The last two do not have their own religious
tribunals. The list of Recognized Religious .. does not in-
clude several Christian communities, such as Christian Monophysite, like
the Copts and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Protestant-Lutheran,
the Baptist and the Quaker, nor certain other religious communities
within or outside the bounds of the Jewish community. Priests of the
various religious communities are in charge of conducting marriages andi, • .• 108
notifying the authorities for the purpose of registration, and the tribu-
nals of recognized communities have jurisdiction in certain matters of
personal status, sometimes to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil
courts. There are differences in the scope of jurisdiction among the vari-
ous communities. The Muslim tribunal has the broadest powers. In cer-
tain matters the jurisdiction of the religious tribunals is exclusive, while
in others it is concurrent and depends on the consent of all the parties in-
volved.' 9
Both the religious tribunals and the civil courts primarily apply the re-
ligious laws of the relevant parties to questions of personal status," ° in
addition to relevant laws enacted by the Knesset."' The difference be-
tween the application of religious law by the civil courts on the one hand
and the religious tribunals on the other hand is apparent in two matters:
first, each of these jurisdictions applies its own rules of procedure and
evidence, and second, the civil courts take into consideration rules of pri-
vate international law (conflict of laws) whereas the religious tribunals
106. See generally EDOARDO VIlTA, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MATTERS OF
PERSONAL STATUS IN PALESTINE (1947).
107. See Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, 1939 PALESTINE GAZETTE, Supp.
2, no. 898, 459 (adding the Second Schedule to the Palestine Order in Council, 1922-1947);
see also RUBINSTEIN & MEDINA, supra note 6, at 149.
108. See Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance of 1919, 2 DRAYTON, LAWS
OF PALESTINE 903 (1934).
109. See Palestine Order in Council, 1922, 2 DRAYTON, LAWS OF PALESTINE 2581
(1934), Arts. 47, 51-54; Rabbinical Tribunals Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law,
1953, 7 L.S.I. 139, (1952-53); Druze Religious Tribunals Law, 1962, 17 L.S.I. 27, (1962-63);
see also PINHAS SHIFMAN, FAMILY LAW IN ISRAEL (Jerusalem, 1984) (Hebrew).
110. See 1922 Order in Council, art. 47 (for the civil courts); Rabbinical Tribunals Ju-
risdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, section 2 (for the Jewish religious tribunals).
111. See, e.g., Sucession Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 58, (1964-65).
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disregard them. Due to the jurisdiction and autonomy of the religious
tribunals, Israel had to add to its 1991 ratification of the 1966 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights a reservation that "to the
extent that such law [the religious law of the relevant parties] is inconsis-
tent with its obligations under the Covenant, Israel reserves its right to
apply that law.
112
Although, as mentioned, the religious tribunals are in principle
autonomous and may apply their respective legal system, Israel's Su-
preme Court has decided that these tribunals have to comply with certain
laws of the State, such as the Succession Law."' Moreover, they also
have to apply general legal principles derived from the basic values of Is-
rael's legal system, including human rights. Thus, in view of the right to
freedom of movement, the Supreme Court has limited the power of a
Jewish religious tribunal to prohibit a party to leave the country.114
Similarly, the Court has ruled that the tribunal must judge in conformity
with the presumption of equal partnership of spouses in the property ac-
quired by one of them."'
Although the jurisdiction of the Rabbinical tribunals is not broader
than that of some of the other communities, it has given rise to special
problems and considerable opposition from many Jews, while it seems
that no such resentment with regard to tribunals of other religious com-
munities has been recorded. Probably, the opposition to the Jewish re-
ligious tribunals stems from three reasons. First, many non-religious
Jews resent the exclusive authority of the religious institutions and con-
sider it a case of religious coercion." 6 Second, although Jewish law is
quite liberal on certain matters, such as divorce by consent, it neverthe-
less includes some rather strict rules and restrictions, as well as discrimi-
112. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, was signed by Is-
rael on December 19, 1996, and ratified in 1991 with the above reservation. Under an ad-
ditional declaration, Israel's state of emergency constitutes a public emergency within the
meaning of Article 4(1) of the Covenant and, therefore, the State may derogate from some
of its obligations under Article 9 of the Covenant.
113. The Succession Law, 1965, 19 L.S.I. 58, (1964-65). If a religious tribunal disre-
gards a provision of a law of the Knesset expressly addressed also to the religious tribu-
nals, its decision may be set aside by the Supreme Court because of excess of jurisdiction.
However, the case law of the Court on this matter is not uniform. See RUBINSTEIN &
MEDINA, supra note 6, at 194.
114. See H.C. 3914/92, Lev v. The Religious District Tribunal, 48(2) P.D. 491. For an
analysis of this judgment, see Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Rethinking Legal Pluralism in Is-
rael: The Interaction Between the High Court of Justice and Rabbinical Courts, 20 TEL
Aviv U. L. REv. 683 (1997) (Hebrew).
115. See H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. The Supreme Rabbinical Tribunal, 48(2) P.D. 221. For
an analysis of this judgment, see Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 114.
116. See sources cited supra note 14.
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nation between the genders,117 which may be considered outdated and
may create unnecessary hardship. Third, while other religious communi-
ties in Israel are rather homogeneous, the Jewish population is very het-
erogeneous, but so far the State has in fact given the Orthodox move-
ment a monopoly over official activities, namely, the registration of
marriages and jurisdiction in matters of personal status. This has engen-
dered resentment from members of other movements, including the
Conservative, Reform,'1 8 Kara'ites," 9 and Falashas (the Ethiopian
Jews). 2°
It thus follows that non-believers and members of an unrecognized re-
ligious group are at a disadvantage in matters of personal status. There
are no lay officials authorized to celebrate and register marriages, there
is no secular law on marriages, and civil courts have no jurisdiction in
matters of marriage and divorce. However, in order to alleviate the
situation, in those matters of dissolution of marriage which are not within
the exclusive jurisdiction of a religious tribunal, the civil courts do have
jurisdiction in certain circumstances."'
XI. CONCLUSION
This survey has shown that under Israeli law, freedom of conscience,
belief, religion, and worship is guaranteed in most spheres, in line with
the State's international obligations. This freedom is based both on leg-
islative acts and on court decisions. It must, however, be balanced with
other rights and interests and may be restricted for reasons of public or-
der and security. It is protected inter alia by provisions of the penal law.
Israel also respects freedom of access and of worship at the Holy
Places and ensures the protection of these sites. However, in this sphere
the powers of the courts are somewhat restricted in favor of the govern-
117. Cf A. ROZEN-ZVI, ISRAELI FAMILY LAW, THE SACRED AND THE SECULAR 216
(1990) (Hebrew). An additional area of concern is the status of an apostate under the
Rabbinical Tribunals Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953. See Rabbi Y. Yis-
raeli, The Marriage and Divorce Law in Practice, 21-22 GUEVILIN 37 (1965) (Hebrew);
Asher Maoz, The Personal Status of the Apostate, 7 MISHPATIM 442 (1977) (Hebrew).
118. See ABRAMOV, supra note 14, at 354-79.
119. The Chief Rabbi of the Kara'ites in Israel is, however, recognized as a competent
"Registering Authority" under the Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance of
1919. See supra note 108; see also MICHAEL CORINALDI, THE PERSONAL STATUS OF THE
KARA'ITES (1984) (Hebrew); Lapidoth & Corinaldi, supra note *, at 289-92.
120. See MICHAEL CORINALDI, ETHIOPAN JEWRY-IDENTITY AND TRADITION
(1988) (Hebrew). See generally Baruch Bracha, Personal Status of Persons Belonging to a
Non-Recognized Religious Community, 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 88 (1975).
121. See Matters of Dissolution of Marriage (Jurisdiction in Special Cases) Law, 1969,
23 L.S.I. 274, (1968-69).
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ment, which is considered to be better suited to deal with certain matters
concerning the Holy Places because of the international aspects of this
sphere. An overriding consideration is the need to preserve law and or-
der-a consideration which is of particular relevance with regard to the
Temple Mount.
Freedom of religion requires equality of civil and political rights
among members of different faiths. Equality of all citizens is a basic
tenet of Israeli law, and distinctions are only permitted if they are objec-
tively justified by the nature and circumstances of the case. Such distinc-
tions are sometimes necessary in order to respect the right of a religious
group to be different and preserve its identity.
Incitement, namely severe intolerance, is outlawed by the provisions of
penal law. Israel also recognizes the right to change one's religion.
Proselytizing is permitted, but not for material gain. The subject may be
dealt with in new legislation. Every Israeli has the right to choose be-
tween a secular and a religious school for his children. Private religious
schools are also recognized.
In matters of personal status, religious freedom is both particularly
evident and problematic. The right of priests to celebrate and register
marriages and the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the recognized religious
communities in certain matters of personal status do enhance the relig-
ious freedom and autonomy of those communities. But on the other
hand, since some of these powers are exclusive, people who do not be-
long to any religious group and those who are part of an unrecognized
denomination may have grave difficulties. One way to overcome this
hardship would be the introduction of an optional civil marriage"' as well
as a secular law on matters of personal status to be applied by the civil
courts which would have parallel jurisdiction.
122. See PINHAS SHIFMAN, CIVIL MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL: THE CASE FOR REFORM
(1995) (Hebrew).
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